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while export prices rose by 5.9 percent. If we exclude petroleum products (presumably not the point of Professor Samuelson's arguments), import prices rose by only 1.7 percent. Thus, U.S. terms of trade have been steady, or perhaps even improving, since 1990.
Even if we ignore the empirical counterevidence, Professor Samuelson's theoretical proposition remains valid as a logical possibility. But what are its policy implications? Alas, none. Neither trade policy, nor any other available policy, will take us back to the desirable situation 1. The only action that can restore 1 is to "bomb China back into the stone age" of their older lower productivity. We sincerely hope Professor Samuelson is not proposing that. The only practical policy question facing the United States now is this: Given that we are now in situation 2, do we go on trading freely or not? Should we switch to the protectionist alternative 3, namely, Fortress America?
If our objective is to maximize aggregate U.S. economic welfare, the answer is unequivocally no. All the standard arguments apply to this comparison and say that 2 is better for aggregate U.S. economic welfare than 3. Only in Professor Samuelson's worst-case scenario is there no difference between 2 and 3, because if even with a free trade policy the comparative advantage configuration is such that our trade is exactly zero, then there is no gain from trade. However, there is no loss from keeping our trade free either, so situations 2 and 3 are equivalent in that case. In all other cases, 2 is positively superior to 3 from the aggregate U.S. perspective. Therefore protectionists should take no comfort from Professor Samuelson's intervention on their behalf; they must still go on looking for their guru.
Of course aggregate economic gains are not enough to establish either the ethical desirability or political practicality of the policy of free trade on its own, unless mechanisms whereby winners actually compensate losers are in place. Therefore the analysis recommends a policy package-keep trade free, but compensate the losers it creates. We believe that Professor Samuelson and we are in agreement on this.
Avinash Dixit Gene Grossman Princeton University Princeton, New Jersey
Response from Paul A. Samuelson Leo Tolstoy wrote to his admired younger friend, Anton Chekhov, "Stop writing plays. They are as bad as Shakespeare's."
Apparently, I perpetrated a major indiscretion when explicating an old truth about comparative advantage in the Summer 2004 Journal of Economic Perspectives. Outnumbering the letters I received from illiterates in economics incorrectly welcoming me as a new champion of protectionism were the letters from sophisticated friends reproaching me for muddling the case for free trade.
I write briefly for two purposes. First, the correct arguments by Paul A. Samuelson in the JEP do not (repeat, not) persuade me to advocate abandoning free trade policies by advanced industrial countries like the United States, by successfully developing economies like Japan or India, or by still-floundering basketeconomy cases in Africa or the Middle East. The reason is simple and nonequivocal: Economic history and best economic theory together persuade me that leaving or compromising free trade policies will most likely reduce future growth in well being in both the advanced and less productive regions of the world. Protectionism breeds monopoly, crony capitalism and sloth. It does not achieve a happy and serene egalitarian society.
My second purpose is to explore what ought to be the credo of a scholar who is at the same time a humanitarian person. In this connection a relevant case study is David Ricardo's famous late-in-life recantation against his earlier belief that an industrial revolution invention of machinery would necessarily increase the well being of everyone-of capitalists, of landowners and of workers. He had even brainwashed his laissez-faire followers into a similar belief. Imagine then the consternation and resentment of a John R. McCulloch when the third and final edition of Ricardo's Principles contained a new chapter "On Machinery" purporting to prove that some inventions could reduce the wage demand for labor (and could even reduce the ["Kuznets"] real GDP) (see Ricardo, 1817, 1820, as edited by Sraffa).
Truth-telling brought Ricardo few kudos but much reproach. Even the best modern commentators-Wicksell, Schumpeter, Kaldor, Stiglerthought the old boy had lost his marbles, had abandoned Say's Law and (in modern lingo) had alleged that the Invisible Hand of competition could systematically lead to "non-Pareto optimality" and deadweight loss. David Ricardo was a notoriously poor expositor, and much of his overblown reputation traces to his gratuitous obscurities. Therefore, in two idle moments in the 1980s, Samuelson (1988 Samuelson ( , 1989 had to vindicate Ricardo as being right about what was a banality: Yes, technical change can either raise or lower the market-clearing real wage. Wicksell never doubted that. But the modern commentators forgot that Ricardo was a Malthusian who believed that a lowered demand for labor would so reduce population as to reduce total GNP and its wage share. No Pareto nonoptimality in that.
To connect up with my decision to publish in the JEP, Ricardo was never led by his correct chapter "On Machinery" to become a Luddite who hankered to throw wooden shoes into new real life machines. He pragmatically believed that workers would end up better off after winwin inventions and win-lose inventions both took place. No 2 ϩ 2 ϭ 4 argument could prove that. But the sage economist must muster best available knowledge about history and theory in giving plausible pragmatic advice.
Still, in this discussion of credo about publication, tolerate some autobiographical palaver. Bhagwati (1958) and Johnson (1955) several decades ago: the 2004 lose-win effect depends not at all on inelasticity of any demand, instead being able to occur under favorable J. S. Mill demand elasticities. Also, 2004 broke new ground in providing a novel money-metric-utility that measured precisely "gains of winners" and "losses of losers," which did properly net out both consumer gains and producer losses. Moreover, its proof deliberately stuck completely to the canonical Ricardo-Mill labor-only model.
My final comment is substantive. Those orthodox pals who complained that my apostasy that would surely be misunderstood and be muddling, seemed to be mostly of the following belief: "Yes, there will be both win-win and win-lose inventions during the next 50 years. Any innuendo that win-lose inventions will probably outweigh win-win inventions is paranoid and implausible. Ergo, it's a lay-down hand for free trade." Fair enough. However, if the next 50 years are like the last 50 years, there are plausible reasons why the advanced nations can expect to encounter in a biased way some possible preponderance of win-lose inventions from abroad. (Toyota overtaking General Motors and Ford falls into the win-lose taxonomy.) The basic explanation for this presumptive bias is that the Wagnerian leitmotiv of 1950 -2050 will be the continuing and ineluctable spread of imitative knowledge from the metropolitan heartland to the sleepwalking peripheries where low-paid, educatable people and businesses can most easily learn by imitation. The result is not a Spenglerian "Decline of the West," but rather a trend toward (but not necessarily all the way) to geographical equalization. Bet for the future half century to be a repetition of what took place historically in the first half: continued growth in the advanced world but arguably at a lower rate ceteris paribus due partly to competing imitative inventions abroad.
It may be of interest that none of my chastening pals expressed concern about globalization's effects on greater inequality in a modern age when transfers from winners to losers do trend politically downward in present-day democracies. There is, however, another source relevant to Martin's involvement with economics during the Depression, a source to which Martin did not draw attention while he was at the Treasury and Federal Reserve: his founding editorship in 1932-1933 of The Ecomomic Forum. That unusual quarterly journal brought together contributors including the more adventurous of leading economic theorists from John Maynard Keynes and Irving Fisher (advocating 100 percent reserve requirements on bank deposits) to Bertil Ohlin (on Knut Wicksell) and Erik Lindahl (on Sweden's monetary experiment), but also decidedly nonmainstream amateur economists such as Major C. H. Douglas and the poet Ezra Pound, whose ecomomic views Romer and Romer would assuredly not regard as sensible (Dimand, 1991) . The inaugural issue (Winter 1932 (Winter -1933 Martin's early economic views, and those of his fellow editor Joseph Mead, were expressed in the twenty-page introduction to the first issue of the Economic Forum: "The need for better planning is shown by the faulty interplay between our monetary mechanism and the system of production; by the maldistribution of the means of payment and the inability of the people to consume the products actually produced; by the waste and inefficiency, resulting from plant duplication and overly optimistic expansion of capital equipment in various industries; by the effects on employment of the mechanization of economic activity where laborsaving devices can be applied. . . . However, the greatest impetus to the growing conviction that the monetary system can and must be so controlled and regulated so as to stabilize the price level within reasonable limits, has come from the brilliant discussions of John Maynard Keynes" (pp. 15, 19) . The Economic Forum ceased publication in 1937, and was largely forgotten, along with Martin's involvement. The first biography of Martin is only now forthcoming (Bremner, 2004) 
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